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Summary
All advanced industrialized societies  face  the problem of air pollution produced by
motor vehicles. In spite of striking improvements in internal combustion engine
technology, air pollution in most urban areas is still measured at levels determined to be
harmful to human health.  Throughout the 1990s and beyond, California and France
both chose to improve air quality by means of technological innovation, adopting
legislation that promoted clean vehicles, prominently among them, electric vehicles
(EVs). In California, policymakers chose a technology-forcing approach, setting
ambitious goals (e.g., zero emission vehicles), establishing strict deadlines and issuing
penalties for non-compliance. The policy process in California called for substantial
participation from the public, the media, the academic community and the interest
groups affected by the regulation. The automobile and oil industries bitterly contested
the regulation, in public and in the courts. In contrast, in France the policy process was
non-adversarial, with minimal public participation and negligible debate in
academic  circles. We argue that California's stringent regulation spurred the
development of innovative hybrid and fuel cell vehicles more effectively than the
French approach. However, in spite of the differences, both California and France have
been unable to put a substantial number of EVs on the road. Our comparison offers
some broad lessons about how policy developments within a culture influence both the
development of technology and the impact of humans on the environment.
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In an effort to reduce air pollution in Los Angeles and other metropolitan areas in
the state of California, the California Air Resources Board (CARB)
1 adopted in
September 1990 a plan to encourage the development and use of zero emission vehicles
(ZEV). At the time only battery-powered electric vehicles (EVs) qualified as ZEVs while
other potential ZEV technologies, such as fuel cells and flywheels, were far from  being
commercially viable. The ZEV mandate was just one component of a multi-pronged
attack on pollution, but it was the one that attracted the most attention throughout the
following decade.
The regulation created in California is an example of technology-forcing; it
required the regulated industry to produce and sell efficient electric vehicles, within a set
period of time, even though the technology was not fully developed when the regulations
were created. As in the case of the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) that
instigated the auto industry to introduce catalytic converters, the major automakers, the
oil industry as well as several policy analysts bitterly contested the ZEV regulation.
Indeed the mandated development of EVs triggered a controversy about the merits of the
new technology that engaged substantial public participation in California and in the rest
of the country. This is not surprising. To a far greater degree than people in other
industrialized countries, Americans often fervidly debate technological issues, whether
concerning electric cars, information technologies, antidepressant drugs (Prozac), public
health measures (fluoridation) or national defense systems (Strategic Defense Initiative).
And the controversies that typically accompany public discourse on any of these
technologies have usually intensified each time the new technology was regulated by the
federal government or, as in the case of the ZEV mandate, by a state agency
2.
Over the same time period, starting in 1992, and throughout the 1990s, the French
government designed policies and passed legislation whose objective was to encourage
the deployment of EVs as a means to improve air quality. But in France the process of
creating regulations designed to promote EVs was remarkably bereft of conflict between
government and industry and the role of interest groups was much more restrained than
was the case in the United States. Indeed one would have been hard pressed to find any
debate at all about EVs in France.
Our review contrasts the EV policies adopted in California and France, the
relationships between industry and government, societal attitudes toward technology and
the role of interest groups
3. We explore the distinctive features of US regulation of air
pollution in the transportation sector and describe how and why Americans have paid
exceptional attention to electric cars, show how polarized the debate about EVs was in
the United States, and contrast that debate with the collegial atmosphere that
characterized the emergence of EVs in France. We compare what has happened to date in
the two settings with respect to EV technology and the effects on urban air pollution. Our
objective is to extract from the comparison some broad lessons about how policy
developments within a culture influence technology development and influence human
impacts on the environment.
2. Air pollution in California and in France
 Once in a while a whole day would be clear, nobody quite knew why.
     Raymond Chandler, The Long Goodbye3
Over the past 33 years, California has distinguished itself for passing the most
innovative and advanced legislation to control and reduce air pollution produced in the
transportation sector, mainly because the Los Angeles basin and other metropolitan areas
in the state have suffered the worst air quality in the country
4. Nowadays, in most
metropolitan areas, cars and trucks are the major source of air pollution. This holds true
in California, where mobile sources are responsible for 33% of smog (EPA, 1998). Over
the last five decades, automobile use has increased steadily in California as well as in the
rest of the United States (TRB, 1997; AAMA, 1998) and in every other industrialized
country (Schipper, 1995). Table 2 shows the progressive growth in population in
California, paralleled by the rise in the number of registered vehicles and number of








1960 16 8 71
1980 24 17 155
2000 33.4 23.9 306.3
Table 1. The rise in population, registered vehicles, and VMT in California: 1960-2000
         Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2002, Ward’s, 2002, CARB, 2000, Caltrans, 2001)
These trends show no sign of abating soon: as measured by VMT, automobile use is
forecasted to increase in the foreseeable future (OTA, 1994). Despite the steady rise of
population and VMT in the Los Angeles area, air quality has improved substantially, as
shown by the trend represented in figure 1. (Ozone trends in the Basin Area and the Ile-
de-France). Nonetheless, there are still numerous days when ozone levels remain higher
than the standard judged safe by the state.































































Ile de France >110 mg/m3
 LA Basin >234 mg/m3
LA Basin >180 mg/m3
Ile de France >180 mg/m3
Figure 1:  Ozone air quality violations in Los Angeles and Paris
Sources: SCAQMD, 2003 and Airparif, 2003.4
Thus progress in air quality achieved by means of strict air pollution control regulation
and ever-improving emission control technology has been insufficient
5. The air of the Los
Angeles Basin remains extremely unhealthy and the state of California dominates the
U.S. smog "top ten," boasting five areas with the highest ozone levels and eight areas
with the most frequent violations of the federal standard
6. Moreover, the CARB
maintained that projected increases in VMT (384 billion in 2010 and 475 billion in 2020)
would slow and, possibly, reverse the decline in ozone levels (Caltrans, 2001).  Along
with the rise in miles driven, the major reason that explains the inadequacy of emission
reduction improvements is the stagnation in automobile fuel economy over the last
thirteen years. In 1988, the new car fleet fuel economy was 28.8 miles per gallon (mpg)
and in 2000 it was 28.1 mpg (EPA, 2000). Furthermore, the market share of sport utility
vehicles (SUV) and light trucks, which are about a third less fuel-efficient than passenger
cars, has increased from 22% in 1983 to 46% in 2000 thus lowering the average fuel
economy of light-duty vehicles to 24 mpg, the lowest since 1980 (EPA, 2000). The
increasing popularity of SUVs and light trucks, subject to lax government fuel efficiency
standards, as well as the rise in VMT has largely offset the air quality gains brought by
pollution reduction technologies (catalytic converters, fuel injection, variable valve
control). Furthermore, throughout the period under exam, the worsening urban traffic
congestion effected by growth in car-based mobility in most urban areas, precipitated
adverse social consequences (e.g. gridlock, rising volumes of polluting exhaust and
monetary losses) (Shrank and Lomax, 2002)
7.
In France, the transportation system has provided French residents with a high
level of personal mobility, although less than that enjoyed by Americans
8.  See Table 2









# of EVs # of
HEVs
France 58.5 32.1 41 699.6 7,744 164
U. S. 271 203.7 77.6 (2001) 7136 (2001) 5,000 31,132
California 33.4 23.9 N.A. 841.9 3,900
9 16,000
Table 2. Data on Road Transportation for France, the USA and California in 2002*
*: except where noted
Passenger-km: One passenger traveling the distance of one km. Total passenger-km traveled gives the total
distance traveled by all people
Sources: (1) Population: Bureau of Census, 2002 (US and CA); Insee (France); (2) Motor vehicle
registrations: DoF, 2002 (US and CA); CCFA, 2002 (France); (3) Passenger Activities: FHWA, 2003 (US
and CA); CCFA, 2000; (France); (4) Motor Vehicles: Ward, 2002 US; CARB, 2002 (CA); CCFA, 2002
(France); (5) EVs: Energy Information Administration, 2002, (US); Cackette, 2003 (CA); GIVE, 2003
(France); (6) HEVs: EVAAA, 2003 (US); Eley, 2003 (CA); Boyer, 2003 (France).
But, as in the United States, the growth in automobile mobility has worsened air quality.
In 1993 cars, trucks and buses produced about half of the ozone-forming hydrocarbons,
60% of all the carbon monoxide pollution and 68% of the oxides of nitrogen, 90% of lead
and 41 % of the particulates (Citepa, 1998). And if since 1980, as Table 3 shows, total
(i.e. from industrial, service and transportation sectors) emissions of NOx, have declined5
considerably, the contribution of the transport sector to overall emissions output over the
same period did not decline.
Table 3. NOx emissions (total and from the transportation sector) in France and California 1980-
2000. All data are in kilotons. Sources: Citepa, 2002 for France and CARB, 2002 for California.
Although new cars met ever stricter standards, in several metropolitan areas, including
those of Grenoble, Lyon, Marseilles, and Paris, air quality remained far from satisfactory
throughout the 1990s owing to the increase in volume of road traffic (Patel, 1995). Ile-de-
France, the region around Paris where 19% of the French population (11 million people)
lives, has received the greatest attention because it is one of the most polluted and
politically important areas of the country. In 1995 and 1997 there were four "level 2"
ozone alerts, (concentrations exceeding 180 micrograms per cubic meter).
10
3.  The California ZEV mandate
In September 1990, convinced of the inadequacy of existing federal air quality
standards, the CARB proposed new regulations based on new definitions of types of
vehicle as a policy to reduce motor vehicle emissions in California. The proposal required
the phased introduction of low-emission vehicles and the clean fuels needed by them. The
low-emission vehicles were to meet one of four sets of exhaust emission standards. The
emission standards (shown in Table 4) established by the Board were: Transitional Low-
Emission Vehicles (TLEVs), Low Emission Vehicles (LEVs), Ultra-Low-Emission
Vehicles (ULEVs) and Zero-Emission Vehicles (ZEVs) (CARB 1990).
Category NMOG* (g/mile) CO (g/mile) NOx (g/mile)
CV** 0.250 3.4 0.4
TLEV 0.125 3.4 0.4
LEV 0.075 3.4 0.2
ULEV 0.04 1.7 0.2
ZEV 0.000 0.0 0.0
Table 4. California Standards for Light Vehicles.
        * Non-methane organic gases (i.e. hydrocarbons with the exclusion of methane).
        ** Conventional vehicles.
       Source: (CARB, 1990)
Unlike the standards for TLEVs, LEVs and ULEVs, those for ZEVs could not be met by
means of gasoline-powered cars, even those equipped with the most advanced emission-
control technology available. The portion of the new regulations that dealt with ZEVs
(hereafter the ZEV mandate) mandated that 2% of all passenger cars and light trucks (less
Pollutant 1980 1990 2000
France NOx Total 1654 1585 1435
France NOx Transport   860 1038  728
California NOx Total 1843 1789 1286
California NOx Transport  884 995 6746
than 3750 lbs. loaded vehicle weight) sold in the state by every major car manufacturer
must emit zero exhaust emissions, beginning with the 1998 models
11. The percentage of
zero emission vehicles was to increase to 5% in 2001 and to 10% in 2003. The CARB
could fine an automaker failing to meet the ZEV requirement up to $5,000 for each
violation.
Although strongly opposed to the mandate, Chrysler, Ford and General Motors
(GM) responded to the challenge presented by the CARB by forming, together with the
Department of Energy (DOE) and the Electric Power Resource Institute (EPRI)
(representing the electric utilities), the U.S. Advanced Battery Consortium (USABC).
The primary objective of the consortium was to improve existing battery technology, as it
was generally assumed that, without major improvements in that sector, no electric
vehicle meeting a satisfactory range (~ 100 miles with one charge) would have been
ready by 1998.
In 1992 and 1994, the CARB reviewed the status of technological progress and
upheld the mandate in its original form. Most of the attention of the CARB, as well as
that of anybody interested in the potential of EVs, was focused on the state of the art of
battery technology, unanimously recognized as the Achilles' heel of electric cars. In the
early 1990s, the few types of batteries considered reliable (e.g., lead-acid, nickel-
cadmium) were also the ones that provided the most disappointing performance. In 1995
in order to assess the current state and the future prospects of battery technology, the
CARB commissioned a study to a team of four experts. The report that came out of the
study (Kalhammer et al., 1995), concluded that: a) lead-acid (Pba) and nickel-cadmium
battery technology had improved significantly during the early 1990s and would be
available in 1998, although some of their characteristics would remain well below the
midterm criteria set by the USABC; b) Several types of advanced batteries (nickel-metal
hydride, lithium ion, sodium-nickel chloride) showed excellent promise to meet the
USABC midterm goals and were good enough to allow the development of pilot-scale
production; c) The plans to initiate commercial-scale battery production (10,000-40,000
battery packs per year) depended on commitments made by car manufacturers to buy
batteries on that scale; d) The battery manufacturers and researchers interviewed by the
panel were unanimously convinced that the ZEV mandate had accelerated investment and
progress in developing advanced batteries for electric vehicles. Further progress hinged
on a stable program aimed at developing EVs with advanced batteries; e) In a best-case
scenario, with no technical or decision delays in any of the various development phases,
electric vehicles powered by advanced batteries could become available in 2000 or 2001.
By the end of 1995, the CARB technical staff reached conclusions that reflected those
contained in the technical assessment made by the panel about batteries (CARB, 1995):
• Lead-acid batteries remain the primary high-volume option for 1998 electric vehicles,
but would not be able to satisfy long-term requirements such as reasonable long
range.
• Although some advanced batteries (i.e., non-lead-acid) would be available by 1998,
high production volumes of advanced batteries are not expected until 2001.
• The existing ZEV requirements should be altered to be more responsive to these issues.7
In March 1996, the CARB suspended the ZEV requirements for the model years
between 1998 through 2002, replacing them with an agreement under which the
automakers committed to introduce on the market electric vehicles as early as 1996 and
to supply as many as 3,750 EVs (~ 0.02 percent of all the cars sold in California in one
year) between 1998 and 2000. The CARB also worked out separate Memoranda of
Agreement (MOAs) with each of the seven automakers subject to the ZEV requirement.
According to the MOAs, automakers would manufacture cleaner light-duty vehicles
nationwide by 2001 and would continue the R&D efforts aimed at introducing large
volumes of EVs by 2003
12. For its part, the CARB was obligated to work with the state
and local authorities to ensure the development of ZEV infrastructure, remove barriers to
the introduction of ZEVs and contribute to the implementation of incentive programs for
ZEVs (CARB, 1996a). If the automakers breached the MOA by failing to fulfill their
obligations, the CARB had the authority to reinstate the provisions of the original ZEV
mandate and to impose damage penalties of up to $100 million for breach of contract.
In order to encourage the development of advanced batteries, the MOA included
provisions granting multiple ZEV credits to EVs powered by high (> 60 Wh/kg) specific-
energy batteries. The credits scheme functioned as an incentive to use advanced batteries
at the expense of lead-acid batteries; in other words, they favoured EVs capable of at
least 100-mile range (CARB, 1996b).
In 1995, the CARB staff had discussed possible amendments to the LEV
regulation in order to provide greater flexibility to the auto industry to meet California’s
emissions requirements. After having reviewed the existing information about the
technology of hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs), CARB staff proposed that HEVs with an
all-electric range of at least 30 miles could receive partial ZEV credits (CARB, 1995)
13
but in June 1996, CARB decided to drop the proposal of partial ZEV credits for HEVs
(CARB, 1996c). Two years later, CARB changed its mind about hybrid technology:
hybrid electric vehicles had become increasingly attractive to policymakers because they
did not require esoteric technology and provided already substantial benefits towards the
goals of automobile emission reduction and fuel-efficiency improvements
14. The HEV
models offered on the US market after 1999 provided the same range drivers expected
from ICEVs, did not suffer from the recharging-time problems (whether perceived or
real) of EVs and were significantly more fuel efficient than most conventional gasoline
cars
15.
At the end of 1998, the CARB amended again the mandate introducing a new category of
extremely clean cars: the super ultra low emission vehicle (SULEV) standard that stood
to gain partial zero emission vehicle (PZEV) credit toward the 10 per cent  requirement
16.
Under the 1998 amendments, 4 per cent of the cars offered for sale by the automakers
had to be electric, while the remaining 6 per cent of the original 10% ZEV requirement
set for 2003 could be met with PZEVs (CARB, 1999).
Ten years after the ZEV mandate was first proposed, the most crucial uncertainty
about the feasibility of large volume sales of EVs regarded the cost and the performance
of rechargeable batteries. In order to answer lingering questions about recent progress
made by battery manufacturers, the CARB contracted a second battery-technology
assessment to three experts who in June 2000, produced a second report about batteries.
The panel concentrated its investigation on advanced batteries having estimated that lead-
acid and nickel-cadmium batteries would not provide the performance expected by large8
numbers of customers. According to the panel’s findings the best candidate EV-battery
was NiMH (Nickel-Metal Hydride)
17. On the basis of the battery panel assessment, the
CARB biennial review held in September 2000 confirmed the requirement for 4% pure
ZEVs by 2003.
In January 2001, the CARB approved new amendments requiring that, by 2003,
only 2% of the cars (roughly equivalent to 4,650 EVs) to be pure ZEVs, another 6% had
to be PZEVs and the remaining 2% vehicles identified as advanced technology partial
zero emission vehicles (ATPZEVs) (natural gas, hybrid electric, methanol fuel cell) and
capable to satisfy the SULEV standards (CARB, 2001). Other key elements of the
amendments called for a gradual increase of the overall ZEV requirement from 10 % in
2003-2008 to 16 percent in 2018, for the provision of additional credit multiplier based
on the vehicle’s energy efficiency and, starting in 2007, sport utility vehicles and light
trucks would be included in the sales figures employed to calculate the ZEV quotas.
Furthermore, having recognized that lower-range vehicles could satisfactorily fill a
number of market applications, the CARB lowered the minimum range required for a
ZEV to obtain multiple credit to 50 miles on a single charge thus providing a more
gradual incentive for range rather than the “all-or-nothing step function at 100 miles”
used in the previous version of the mandate (CARB, 2001). From the early 1990s until
2002, at any given time, there were never more than 3900 EVs in California, half of
which were owned by government and utility fleets (Cackette, 2003)
3.1 Technology-Forcing and the Biennial Review Mechanism
The CARB staff was well aware that one of the most delicate issues of the LEV
regulations was the technological feasibility of the proposed standards. Indeed the first
CARB proposal for the LEV regulation admitted that
“The requirement for ZEVs is based on the projected viability
of electric vehicles after receiving input from vehicle
manufacturers and electric vehicles design engineers. It is
widely acknowledged that further research and development
will be needed before vehicles capable of meeting the emission
standards in use are ready for commercial production.”
(CARB, 1990)
In order to monitor the progress made by automobile manufacturers the technical team of
CARB claimed that “it would continue to work closely with the vehicle and fuel
industries in implementing the regulations and identifying any appropriate changes to the
regulations that may be needed in the future”. The staff recommended that it would report
back to the Board every two years on the implementation of the ZEV program.
  Although in 1990, battery technology was still costly and no breakthroughs had
occurred for many years, the CARB’s selection of electric vehicles as an appropriate
technology to reduce the problem of urban air quality was not really haphazard. As in
other past technology-forcing regulations, the ZEV mandate relied on the assumption that
the industry was relatively close to developing a viable technology (La Pierre, 1977;
Ashford et al., 1985). Indeed, the CARB staff had been encouraged to pursue the EV
technology option by the EV prototype program launched by GM in the late 1980s
18.9
The success of the ZEV program depended greatly on the CARB’s ability to
design an appropriate regulatory strategy to facilitate the emergence of a battery
technology that could power EV in a cost-effective and reliable way. In this respect
CARB took several decisions that illustrate the agency’s effort to consider new
technological developments and address industry’s concerns without weakening the
technological momentum created by the mandate. In a momentous move, CARB
postponed the deadline for the first ZEV requirement from 1998 to 2003 and allowed
automakers to gain ZEV credits by means of hybrid cars that had unexpectedly benefited
from the advances in battery technology
19.
Although formally the CARB left the choice of the technology to meet the ZEV
requirements to the discretion of the automakers, EVs were the only feasible option at the
time the mandate was conceived. Indeed the ZEV mandate sparked an international
revival of the EV technology that had been dormant for decades. American, French and
Japanese automakers that had neglected research on EVs and advanced batteries
throughout the 1970s and the 1980s resumed their interest in it mainly as a result of the
ZEV mandate (Cornu, 1998; Sato, 2001).
Having favored electricity over other alternative fuels for automotive
transportation, the CARB revealed again its predilection for technology-forcing as it
attempted in the 1998 revisions to influence the technological trajectory development of
batteries. Indeed, by granting ZEV credits to vehicles exceeding 100 mile range the
CARB pushed the development of advanced batteries to the detriment of lead acid
batteries. But with the changes that, in 2001, extended the ZEV credit scheme to low
range EVs, leveling the playing field for lead acid batteries, the CARB showed that
technology-forcing need not be rigid and unresponsive to market concerns as its critics
suggest. In fact, although created in 1990 as a public policy clearly biased in favor of the
development of battery-powered electric cars, the ZEV regulation ended up accelerating
the development of other clean-vehicle technologies, such as fuel cells, which are widely
considered the most promising long-term clean propulsion technology for automobiles
(Williams, 1994; Ogden, 1999)
20.
Discussing the development of fuel cells, Firoz Rasul, CEO of Ballard Power
Systems, one of the leading firms in fuel cells R&D, acknowledged that the mandate
functioned as a catalyst for the development of the new technology. In 2001, Rasul said:
“It’s not just going to happen by market forces…I can certainly tell that
Ballard would not be here today, if it was not for the zero emission vehicle
regulation set in 1988. Without that requirement we could have not raised
the money” (Rasul, 2001).
4. Reactions to the ZEV Mandate
Predictably, the strict standards imposed by the ZEV mandate caught the attention
of many interest groups in California and in rest of the country eliciting a vast array of
reactions. Perceiving the appearance of EVs as a direct threat to their monopoly on fuels
for automobiles, the oil companies were bluntly hostile to the ZEV mandate while the
major automakers were at best reluctant to reconfigure their industry around electric
motors powered by rechargeable batteries.10
On the other hand, electric utilities saw the CARB’s regulations as an opportunity
to expand their markets and optimize the existing electricity generating capacity. Indeed,
a market for EVs would affect the utility rates (Ford, 1994) and would also create
potential new customers. Environmental groups and public health organizations
welcomed the ZEV mandate, but were not as vehement  and resourceful in their support
as the oil and the auto industries were in their opposition to it. Within a year of the
mandate’s approval, both the oil and the auto industry engaged in an intense campaign to
oppose the CARB regulation. The degree of hostility towards the mandate was different
for the two industries since the stakes were different. The automobile-makers were
always going to manufacture automobiles, whereas, in the long run, oil companies risked
the loss of significant fraction of the market and perceived the emergence of electric
vehicles as a long-term threat to their business.
The major automobile manufacturers claimed that the electric vehicles available
on the market had one crucial technical weakness (limited driving range) and were too
costly to be marketable
21. The anti-EV camp employed many strategies to influence the
outcome of the policy decision-making process including:
22 political contributions,
advocacy advertising, funding of studies, traditional lobbying and astroturf lobbying, and
challenges in the courts.
4.1  Lobbying and Public Relations
 With considerable financial resources and political clout at their disposal, the
anti-EV camp was able to make extensive efforts to influence the public debate about the
mandate. The oil companies employed a traditional method of influencing public policy
formulation by contributing money to candidates for political office. Atlantic Richfield
Co., BP America, Exxon, Mobil Oil Co., Phillips Petroleum, Shell Oil Co. and Texaco
donated a total of $1.1 million to legislative candidates in 1994 and in the first six months
of 1995. During the same period, the auto industry donated $276,000 (Kasnitz and
Mashke, 1996). In particular, California's governor Pete Wilson received $325,000 and
$76,000 from oil and auto industry groups, respectively.
Mobil Oil Corporation attempted to secure the approval of the general public
using advocacy advertising strategies. The company regularly purchased advertising
space in the New York Times, USA Today, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post
and large-circulation news magazines such as Newsweek and Time, spending an estimated
$3.5 million (Kasnitz and Mashke, 1996). Aimed at discrediting all potential alternative
fuel vehicles, including electric cars, the Mobil campaign sought to do three things:
1.  Reassure customers that the world was not running out of oil. As part of the    
Clearing the Air series, the Running out of oil? ad (Mobil #1, 1995) warned           
readers that a "sizeable number of regulators and politicians are pushing    
mandates and subsidies
23 to drive the public to buy alternative fuel vehicles”
24.
2.  Illustrate the inadequacy of EV technology as a means of transportation for
the average American and discredit their environmental benefits
25. An ad titled Who
pays for plugging in? reassured the general public that: "We have no problem with
electric cars competing in the marketplace. We do have a problem, though, with11
mandates, particularly mandates at this time that would lock in our current electric
technology. That technology simply is not good enough."
3.  Foster the values of the free-market system, which Mobil saw as threatened by ever-
expanding government regulations and stir up economic apprehension by arguing that
the mandate would cause tax increases.
The oil industry did not limit itself to advocacy advertising. Concerned that the general
public would be skeptical of positions taken by “big business”, oil companies also
resorted to astroturf lobbying
26.
Westerns State Petroleum Association (WSPA), a trade organization of the oil
industry, mobilized two consumer groups that normally lobbied to keep utility bills low:
Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN) and Utility Consumer's Action Network.
Over the course of the anti-ZEV campaign, a group called Californians Against Utility
Company Abuse (CAUCA) was set up by oil companies in order to promote senate bill
SB 1819 and assembly bill AB 3239 which would have prevented the legislature from
using utility revenues to develop an infrastructure for natural gas and electric vehicles.
CAUCA, managed by the Burlingame-based public relations firm Woodward &
McDowell, started its campaign by sending a letter to 200,000 ratepayers urging them to
protest against the proposed $600 million utility investments in alternative support
systems. The letter, signed by TURN executive director Audrie Krause and by Howard
Owens, director of Congress of California Seniors, made no mention that it had been
written by Woodward & McDowell or that the whole effort had been paid by the
WSPA
27. About 50,000 citizens returned postcards to Woodward & McDowell, which in
turn forwarded the cards to legislators' offices. To further its astroturf strategies, WSPA
created fake grassroots movements such as Californians Against Hidden Taxes (CAHT)
and the National Institute for Emergency Vehicle Safety, a one-man group that claimed to
speak for emergency response workers concerned about hazards related to EVs (such as
battery shocks, battery leaks, etc.)
28.
Ultimately the essence of the lobbying efforts produced by automakers and oil
companies could be found in a Request for Proposal issued in the spring of 1995 by the
American Automobile Manufacturers Association (AAMA) an organization that includes
Chrysler, Ford and General Motors. While it acknowledged that “Recent surveys indicate
a majority of Californians believe zero emission vehicles (ZEVs) are a ‘workable and
practical’ means of reducing air pollution”, the Proposal’s objective read as follows: “The
AAMA is conducting a search for a qualified contractor to manage a statewide grassroots
and educational campaign to create a climate in which the state’s mandate requiring
automakers to produce a fixed percentage of electric vehicles beginning in 1998 can be
repealed” (AAMA, 1995).
Industry groups that favoured the ZEV mandate did not refrain from using
astroturf tactics either, although they did so primarily in response to the oil industry
efforts. Electric utilities hired a PR firm, PS Enterprises, to organize the Santa Monica-
based Californians for Jobs and Clean Air (CJCA). The main objective of CJCA was to
create press releases aimed at counteracting the oil industry's bleak news about the effect
of EVs on the California economy
29. In typical astroturf style, the press releases did not12
disclose the origin of the funding for CJCA which was a consortium of electric utilities
(Parrish, 1994).
4.2 Studies about the ZEV mandate
"You think the stories are true?"
"No, "Eric said.
"Then why do you spread them?"
"For the tone of course."
"For the edge."
"For the edge. The bite. The existential burn."
      Don DeLillo, Underworld
The campaign run by interest groups to discredit or to support EVs and the ZEV
mandate borrowed technical arguments, from the supposedly scientific debate that took
place among scientists, engineers and policy analysts who were called to provide
impartial assessment of the new technology. Between 1993 and 1996, researchers around
the country carried out analyses that assessed the technical and the policy issues involved
in the ZEV mandate. In several cases, the technical expertise offered during the crucial
years of the mandate turned out to be almost as tendentious as the rhetoric that fueled the
slogans of lobbyists and PR officials. Indeed, quite a few studies produced to discredit
EVs made assumptions that either conflicted with undisputed data or, more subtly,
emphasized the weaknesses of EVs omitting their strengths. These studies happened to be
the ones that attracted the most attention from the media.
The honor of opening the first round of salvos against the ZEV mandate went to
Sierra Research (SR), a consulting firm based in Sacramento, California, which published
five reports on the emission benefits and the cost-effectiveness of California's low-
emission vehicle regulation. Funded by the AAMA, the report "The Cost-Effectiveness of
Further Regulating Mobile Source Emissions" concluded that: “The ZEV mandate does
not appear to be a cost-effective control strategy even assuming that new car sales
volumes are unaffected and power-plant emissions are zero” (Sierra Research, 1994)
30.
To reach these conclusions SR had to discount emission reductions achieved by EVs in
attainment areas or during seasons with no air quality standards violations, effectively
treating those reductions as without value. Furthermore, in comparing EVs and Internal
Combustion Engine Vehicles (ICEVs), SR analysis ignored the vehicles' operating costs
and considered only initial vehicle costs, thus giving an unfair advantage to ICEVs,
whose operating costs are higher than those of EVs.
Shortly after the Sierra Research reports were greeted by a warm response among
groups hostile to the ZEV mandate, another study brought the controversy about the ZEV
mandate to the national stage. In May 1995, Science published the results of the study
"Environmental Implications of Electric Cars”,
31 conducted at Carnegie-Mellon
University by L.B. Lave, C.T. Hendrikson and F.C. McMichael
32. The thrust of the
Carnegie-Mellon report was that, since the mandate would require the use of many
electric vehicles powered by lead-acid batteries, lead emissions would increase and pose
a threat to Americ`n chtizens. The authors concluded that "electric cars do not deliver the
promised environmental benefits" and that "a 1998 model electric car is estimated to13
release 60 times more lead per kilometre of use relative to a comparable car burning
leaded gasoline" (Lave, Hendrikson and McMichael, 1995). Lamentably, the article
contained several errors that undermined the dramatic conclusions reached by the
authors. Lave and boauthors used obsolete data indicating, for instance, that the energy
density of the lead-acid battery used in the General Motors Impact
33 was 18 Watthour per
kilogram (Wh/kg) while the figure given by GM was 40 Wh/kg (GM, 1996). Although
this error was corrected in the accompanying text, it appeared that all the calculations
were based on the incorrect figure. The number given for the battery mass for the Impact
was 1378 kg (but it was 522 kg according to GM) which was greater than the entire mass
of the car which had a curb weight of 1350 kg. According to Lave et al., the Impact's
range was 50 miles when in fact it was estimated to be at least 70 miles. Furthermore, the
authors estimated an energy capacity of 25 KWh, a figure, apparently obtained by
multiplying the wrong battery mass (1378 kg) by the incorrectly-stated energy density
(18 Wh/kg).
In order to estimate the amount of lead emissions in the environment Lave and co-
authors assumed that the lead used in the batteries was virgin-mined lead, when in fact
about 97% of lead batteries is recycled and only a fraction is produced from virgin lead.
Furthermore, the article did not differentiate between the air-borne emissions of lead and
lead solid waste which is relatively easier to monitor
34.
In 1996 further skepticism about the environmental benefits of EVs emerged in a
study carried out at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (de Neufville et al.,
1996) in which evidence against ZEVs was obtained by means of a selective examination
of facts: thus the setbacks encountered by sodium-sulphur batteries were duly mentioned
but the achievements of NiMH were not; the average life span of several advanced
batteries, according to the MIT researchers, did not reach the 1.5-2 years range when in
fact it does (Karlhammer et al., 1995) and the assertion that supplying additional electric
loads to power EVs would inevitably require using dirty and inefficient power plants was
questionable since electric utilities’ emissions vary greatly across geographical areas
depending upon energy mix, in many actual cases, can provide net environmental
benefits (U.S. GAO, 1994; MacKenzie, 1994).
Not all those who had a stake into the ZEV mandate or were called upon to assess
its viability provided an assessment of it proved to be as partial as the researchers of MIT,
Carnegie Mellon and SR
35. And there was concern by proponents of EV technology over
some aspects of the mandate.  Alan Cocconi president of AC Propulsion Inc., a small
manufacturer of EVs powered by lead-acid batteries based in Southern California
challenged in several occasions the technology-forcing provisions related to battery
development. In March 1994, responding to a Los Angeles Times editorial, Cocconi,
suggested that rather than forcing the sale of 2% EVs in California in 1998, the CARB
should have employed market instruments to create a robust demand for EVs by building
recharge outlets in public places and lending special lane privileges to EV drivers
(Cocconi, 1994). Between 1998 and 2000, AC Propulsion criticized the CARB ZEV
credit scheme aimed at producing incentives for automakers to use advanced batteries.
The ZEV mandate, in the version approved in 1996 and confirmed in 1998 and 2000,
granted extra ZEV credits to automakers on the basis of the range of the EVs they
produced. The arbitrary threshold of 100 miles range precluded any EV passenger car
using lead-acid batteries (that do not have sufficient specific energy to go beyond 70-9014
miles) from achieving any extra ZEV credit. According to Cocconi, relying on costly
advanced battery technology at the expense of inexpensive lead-acid batteries, was bound
to frustrate consumer demand and slow EV market development. In order to stimulate an
affordable near-term market for EVs (i.e. based on EVs powered by relatively cheap PbA
batteries) AC Propulsion proposed to extend the multiple ZEV mechanism below the 100
miles range (Gage, 2000). AC Propulsion’s argument reflected a pessimistic view of the
possibility of the battery industry to improve NiMH battery performance and lower costs
by 2003 while it denied the notion that lead acid batteries were unsuitable for a “real
world” EV. Although the AC Propulsion interest in the revision of the ZEV credit
mechanism was obvious, it was not pushed forward by means of specious arguments, a
circumstance singularly rare in the debate about the ZEV mandate.
4. 3 The ZEV mandate and the Courts
“Scarcely any question arises in the United States which does not
become, sooner or later, a subject of judicial debate.”
Democracy in America, Alexis de Toqueville
It is not surprising that, in a country where the law has traditionally played a
central role in the solution of public policy issues, the controversy about the ZEV
mandate became the subject of judicial review
36. Indeed, as various versions of the ZEV
mandate were adopted, practically all the parties affected, engaged in recurring actions to
challenge it in courts around the country. In May 1992, Massachusetts and New York
adopted the California LEV plan, including the ZEV mandate. Less than two months
later, the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States (MVMA) and
the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers (AIAM) filed a suit against
the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc. v. New York StateDepartment of
Environmental Conservation, 810 F. Suppl. 1331, 1993, hereafter MVMA, 1993). The
automobile manufacturers complained that the LEV rules adopted by the state of New
York violated the "third vehicle" provision of Clean Air Act Section 177 since New York
had not adopted the clean fuels portion of the California's LEV program.
The American Auto Manufacturers Association also sought to enjoin
implementation of tailpipe emissions regulations adopted by the Massachusetts
Department of Environmental Protection (D.E.P.) (American Auto Manufacturers
Association v. Massachusetts D.E.P., 31 F.3d, 18 First Circuit, 1994, hereinafter AAMA,
1994). The action suits filed against the two Northeast states were similar: the automobile
manufacturers claimed that the rules adopted by Massachusetts and New York were pre-
empted by the CAA. In 1994, the court of appeals upheld the adoption of LEV regulation,
but in 1997 the court ruled that Massachusetts DEP ZEV regulations were not identical to
California standards as required by Clean Air Act (CAA) §177 and thus, were pre-empted
by CAA §209(a) (American Automobile Manufacturers Ass’n v. Commissioner, 97). In
the following years, automakers and car dealers, in Massachusetts and in New York, have
repeatedly taken action against the two states’ environmental departments, usually
following the ZEV mandate revision cycles (AIA, 2000; Daimler Chrysler et al., 2002).
In 2001, General Motors filed a suit in California to overturn the mandate,
alleging, among other things, that the CARB ignored the financial impact of the mandate15
on the automakers (O’Dell, 2002). The next year, General Motors, DaimlerChrysler and
several car dealers filed a second suit in California challenging the ZEV regulations on
the grounds that the provisions pertaining to gasoline-electric hybrid vehicles were
related to fuel economy standards and, as such, were preempted by the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act, the federal law that established the CAFE standards in 1975 (US Court
of Appeals, 2002. Subsequently, several environmental and public interest groups filed a
amicus briefs on behalf of the state of California (Hwang, 2002), whereas private
individuals, car dealers and the federal government filed such briefs on behalf of the
plaintiffs (Central Valley Chrysler-Plymouth, INC. et al. v. Michael Kenny, 2002;
Central Valley Chrysler-Plymouth, INC. ET AL. v. Michael P. Kenny, 2002).
Environmental groups, outside California, also seized the opportunities provided
by the American legal system to pursue policy goals in the courts. In January 1996,
shortly before the MOA were signed by the automakers and the CARB, the Sierra Club
Legal Defense Fund (now the Earth Justice Legal Defense Club) filed an antitrust
complaint against the automakers and the oil industry. According to the Fund's
allegations, federal and state anti-trust laws had been violated by the industry in an effort
to derail California's LEV program. The Department of Justice investigated the charges
but eventually rejected the case (EUW, 1996; Becker, 1998).
5. The French Model of EV Development
Méchanicien: Jeune Homme, vous avez bien raison
de vous interesser à cela car. Cela c’est l’avenir. Je
vois dans l’avenir des bornes électriques le long des
routes ou l’on rechargera les accumulateurs, car je
suis pour l’électricité et le progres. Ne me parlez pas
du petrole. (Raymond Queneau, Le Vol d’Icare,
1968)
There are two good reasons to contrast the EV policies pursued by the CARB
with France’s. First, roughly at the same time, the ZEV mandate was developed, French
regulators also developed a strategy that aimed at promoting EVs. Secondly, France is
home to two prominent car companies, Peugeot and Renault, two major battery
manufacturers, Saft and CEAC and Electricité de France (EDF), a large, resourceful
national electric utility. In the early 1990s, the worsening of air quality in French urban
centers led to substantial activity in the policy and legislative arena. In 1994 the results of
the project ERPURS (Evaluation des Risques de la Pollution Urbaine pour la Santé)
Impact de la Pollution Atmospherique sur la Sante en Ile-de France: 1987-1990, an
epidemiological study on the effects of atmospheric pollution on human health in the Ile-
de-France were published. The study established a quantitative linkage between the levels
of NOx, SO2, O3 and the number of deaths and hospitalizations in the region around Paris
(Medina, 1994). The results of the study were reported several times in the daily press
and left little doubt about the seriousness of the air pollution problem in the Ile-de-France
(Kremer, 1995; Normand, 1995). Providentially for the politicians who were under
pressure to find solutions to the problem of air pollution, France found itself in a
favorable situation for the development of electric vehicles for the following reasons:16
1.  The dense layout of French urban centers makes the use of EVs less
problematic than it is in the US. Recent surveys indicate that local
(within 80 km) travel by car accounts for 95% of total car travel. It
was estimated that the average distance covered in each car trip in
1994 was 10 km (URF, 1998) and that 52% of all trips cover less than
3km (Coroller, 1997).
2.  EDF, which is administered under state supervision,
37 relies on the
world's most advanced use of nuclear power. Nuclear power plants
supplying roughly 75 percent of the country's electricity emit the least
amount of pollutants compared with other energy resources. This
means that France stands to benefit the most from replacing ICEVs
with EVs in terms of air quality
38 (GAO, 1994).
3.  In absence of government regulations, EDF in the 1970s and PSA
Peugeot Citroen in the early 1980s had declared an interest in EV
technology (Callon, 1980; Helmer, 1991).
4.  The French government, like most governments in Europe, imposes
heavy taxes on gasoline, making alternative fuels such as electricity
more attractive to car buyers.
Of these favorable factors, France's utilization of nuclear energy played the most pivotal
role in the development of EVs. Although the production of nuclear energy attracts
opposition or at least skepticism in most industrialized nations, it still enjoys strong
support in France on account of the independence from foreign energy resources it
affords. The French anti-nuclear movement has been vehement in its opposition to the
government nuclear program, but its impact has been marginal.
39 Thus, even though the
potential environmental benefits of a French EV program are truly remarkable
40, the
nuclear origin of the electricity that would fuel EVs has weakened the case of the latter in
the eyes of the majority of environmental groups. These would support them only if
electricity was produced by non-nuclear power plants (Parvilliers, 1998; Stephane, 2000;
Godinot, 2001)
41.
5.1 Why France may not be so serious about EVs
Along with the positive factors encouraging the development of EVs in France, a
few factors have hampered it:
1.  Car ownership is less diffuse in France than it is in United States and in
California. Whereas there are 1.3 people for every car in the United States, there
are 1.8 people for every car in France (CCFA, 2000). Given the current
shortcomings of EVs (limited driving range, long refueling time and high price
tag), it is unlikely that a household with only one car would prefer an EV to a
more reliable ICEV.
2.  The French environmental movement is relatively weak compared to most
Northern European countries and to the United States. This means that there is17
less than meets the eye in the widespread consensus on the need to develop clean
technologies to curb air pollution.
3.  The majority of environmental groups have given at best a half-hearted support to
EVs since they could not summon any enthusiasm for a technology that would
reinforce the use of nuclear energy
42.
4.  A successful effort to electrify the fleet of passenger cars, would entail for
substantial tax revenues losses for the French Government, as gasoline is heavily
taxed (at about 80%) whereas electricity is taxed only at about 20% (IEA, 2001b).
5.2 EVs Policies in France: Colbertisme lite
Thus the State, which is answerable for France, is in
charge, at one and the same of yesterday's heritage, today's
interests, and tomorrow's hopes. (Charles de Gaulle,
Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavour, 1971)
The French government has been a key player in the development of EVs so far.
The state-owned electric utility EDF, the auto industry (the three automakers Peugeot,
Citroen and Renault) as well as local administrative institutions have come together to
contribute financially to the development of the electric vehicle industry. An initial
protocol, the Accord-Cadre sur le Developpement du Véhicule Electrique, coordinated by
the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of the Environment, EDF, PSA (a consortium
formed by Peugeot and Citroën), Renault and the government agency Groupe
Interministériel Véhicules Electriques (GIVE
43) on July 28, 1992 considered EVs as a
timely instrument to reduce pollution and noise in French cities as well as a CO2
emissions. The signatories pledged that within three years the automobile companies
would manufacture thousands of EV and EDF would build the appropriate charging
infrastructure. Several government research agencies including ADEME, CNRS, and
INRETS were called to participate into the EV program to bring about the protocol’s
objectives. A more ambitious and formal agreement signed on April 1995 by the minister
of Industry, Renault, PSA, EDF and GIVE defined the modes of engagement of the
various partners in the EV program. The 1995 Accord-cadre aimed for the following by
1999:
•  100,000 EVs should be on France's roads
•  Electric vehicles should constitute 5% of the newly registered vehicles
•  10% of public sector vehicle fleets would be electric (GIVE, 1995).
All the goals were voluntary and no penalties were established in the event the goals were
not achieved.
To formalize cooperation between the government and the private sector and to
provide tangible support for the development of a market for electric vehicles, a decree
was signed in May 1995 allocating financial aid (5000 FF ~$1,050) for private citizens18
who buy electric vehicles. The decree was followed by another protocol in March 1996
that provided more subsidies from EDF (10,000 FF ~ $2,100).
At the end of 1996, given the persistence of poor air quality throughout France,
the French government passed the Loi sur l'Air et l'Utilisation Rationelle de l'Energie
(Law on the Air and the Rational Use of Energy) with the express intent of curbing air
pollution and fostering the rational use of energy. The Loi sur l'Air contained one
provision aimed at promoting the development of alternative fuels vehicles. Under title
VII, article L. 8-B read:
Within two years from the publication of Law 96-1236 of December 30 1996,
the State, the public, national corporations...when they manage a fleet of at
least 20 vehicles must acquire or use, at least, 20 % vehicles powered by
electricity, liquid petroleum gas and natural gas. This measure applies to all
the automobiles ...with the exception of those which weigh more than 3.5
tons" (Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise, 1997).
Although the Loi sur l'Air called for the acquisition of alternative fuels vehicles by
government agencies, no penalties were imposed on the administrative bodies that failed
to equip their fleets with clean vehicles.
In order to make the French public aware of the benefits of electric cars, French
authorities set up EV several rental programs that had the ambitious objective of altering
the way people use vehicles in urban areas and fostering a system of car-sharing where a
fleet of vehicles is used by multiple customers
44. Praxitèle, the most ambitious of these
programs, was started in 1997 in the town of Saint-Quentin en Yvelines on the periphery
of Paris. Launched by a consortium of industrial groups (including Renault, EDF, and
Dassault) and two research institutes (INRIA and INRETS), Praxitèle aimed at providing
French citizens with the mobility, comfort and independence of private car ownership as
well as with the benefits of public transit. At Saint-Quentin en Yvelines fifty electric
Renault Clios were available in strategic places (parking areas near train and bus stations)
to multiple users on a "use it and leave it" principle. Customers had access to the Clios by
means of a special magnetic card and paid for the vehicle only when they were using it
and not when it was parked (Parent, 1997). Praxitèle closed its operations in June 1999 as
it was not considered profitable by the automakers (Parent, 2000)
45.
By the end of 2002, more than 7,500 EVs were circulating in France, far less than
100,000 set as a goal in the 1995 Accord-cadre, but still more than any other
industrialized country
46. Contrary to what happened in California, more than 90% of all
the EVs were used in fleets of municipalities and utilities, bearing out the intention of the
government to strengthen EV policies by means of public procurement programs
(Ademe, 2001).
Although by 1995, Renault had already presented the Next, a hybrid vehicle
prototype
47, and several French policy analysts have since suggested that HEVs could be
a viable technological option to reduce air pollution (Larbaoui, 1998, Badin et al, 2000),
the French legislation and the buying public have barely acknowledged the existence of
the new technology. In fact, to date, the only legislative act that has reflected the progress
of HEV technology came at the end of 2000: a new provision in the tax code offering a19
tax rebate of 1525 euro (~$1600) to customers of HEVs (Law n.2000-1353, JO, 31
Décembre 2000). But despite this financial incentive very few HEVs have been sold
48.
Although, they do not deal with alternative fuel vehicles, two other titles of the
Loi sur l'Air are germane to our cross-national comparison: title IV, Article 12 stated:
"when the alert threshold is trespassed the prefecture takes measures aimed at limiting the
intensity and the effects of the pollution on the population. The measures...entail a
mechanism of restriction or suspension of the activities concurring to the pollution,
including the circulation of vehicles....".
And title V, Article 28-1, by imposing the adoption of plans de deplacements
urban (PDU) (to urban centers with more than 100,000 inhabitants), encouraged to shift
travel demand to more efficient modes: from single occupant vehicle to higher occupancy
modes (carpooling and public transit) or to non-motorized modes (pedestrian and
bicycle). A revealing expression of the intent to achieve the desired air quality goals by
reducing the circulation of private vehicles was exhibited every time the government
decreed a special arrêté (ordinance) of circulation alternée (alternate circulation) in Ile-
de-France in days when air pollution reached health threatening levels
49. Under the
circulation alternée policy, cars with odd-numbered license plates were banned from
driving on odd days and cars with even-numbered license plates were banned on even
days. Following European Union guidelines, all cars were banned during the no-car day
in many French cities or in sections of them, in 1998 and subsequent years (Airparif,
2000).
A view shared by many in the policy community is illustrated by a case presented at the
workshop “Pollutions Atmosphériques: Transports and Santé”, organized by the Institut
pour un Nouvel Environnement in 2002. Philippe Lameloise, head of Airparif, the agency
charged with monitoring air quality in the Paris area, spoke of the recent evolution of CO
pollution in two locations in Paris.  Over a period of ten years, the levels of CO in Place
Victor-Basch have declined dramatically, while on the Champs-Elysées, only a few
hundred meters away from Place Victor-Basch, the decline has been notably modest. The
explanation given for this apparent discrepancy was the following. Place Victor-Basch
has always been in a state of permanent congestion, so that traffic volume cannot increase
any further and the emission reductions reflect the technological improvements in
automobiles. However, on the Champs Elysées, traffic growth continues offsetting the
improvements of the new vehicles. Lameloise concluded that technological
advancements alone would not attain satisfactory reductions of air pollution (Hopquin,
2002)
50. Unfortunately, the actual effectiveness of the PDUs to date, has been
disappointing. For instance, the regional plan approved in 2000 for the Ile-de-France
called for a 6% reduction of automobile traffic by 2006, but by the end of 2001, traffic
had increased by 2% (Hopquin, 2002).
6. Liberalism and Dirigisme
In every case, at the head of any undertaking, where in France you
find the government…in the United States you are sure to find an
association
      Democracy in America, Alexis de Toqueville20
There are two elements of the American cultural landscape that are relevant to
this discussion of EV policies and that set the United States apart from France. To a large
extent the industry reaction against the ZEV mandate can be explained in terms of the
anti-government sentiment that is prevalent among large segments of American society.
Between 1994 and 1996, while the oil and auto industries led their strongest efforts to
derail the mandate, the Republican members of the newly-elected 104
th Congress
launched an unprecedented campaign against environmental regulation that was part of a
broader crusade against the powers of central government. In those years the belief that
the ZEV mandate was a typical example of suspect government interference in the
workings of the market was rarely expressed more clearly than at a CARB workshop in
December 1995. Sacramento assemblyman Bernie Richter, said: “…and the other
decision that is similar to this (mandate) was made in 1917, at the culmination of the
Russian revolution creating the Soviet State, and communizing, and socializing the
Russian economy” (Richter, 1995). What Richter’s remarkably over-the-top historical
parallel reveals is that opposition to the ZEV mandate did not necessarily arise from well-
founded skepticism about the viability that electric vehicles could provide a viable
alternative to gasoline-powered cars, but rather originated from traditional mistrust of
governmental action.
For most of the 1990s, there was intensive national media coverage of the ZEV
mandate. Frequently, dailies would run front-page columns and large circulation weeklies
would publish cover stories about electric cars or about the ZEV mandate itself.
Mainstream publications covered the subject of EVs in neutral or even sympathetic
terms; conservative publications, couched their hostility to the California legislation in
explicit anti-government rhetoric. (Taylor III, 1993; McKenna, 1995)
Several environmental groups challenged the CARB’s policies whenever they
believed that the state agency was caving in to the pressures of the automakers and oil
industry (Kasnitz and Maschke, 1996; Heavner, 2000). Throughout the 1990s, many of
these groups suspected that the state agency had been “captured” by the oil and
automobile interests while the latter claimed that, on the contrary, the CARB had been
unduly influenced by the environmental lobby. Thus, the CARB, the industry and
environmental groups remained locked in a confrontational relationship fueled by mutual
mistrust.
The substantial public participation in the workshops organized by the CARB
attests to the pluralistic nature of the American decision-making process. Under the
pluralist model, the policy agenda was accessible to all organized interests. Ideally, a just
public interest equilibrium should have emerged out of the competition of various policy
claims. However, the process was characterized by untrammeled competition between
interest groups deeply suspicious of each other, by recourse to the courts and ruthless use
of lobbying strategies, and by mistrust and open conflict. If the continued revisions of the
mandate reflected the difficulty of designing an appropriate policy for the development of
a new pollution-control technology, they also suggest the perils encountered in a policy
arena where the CARB was forced into endless brokering among various interest groups.
6.1 Dirigisme and Cooperation
What characterized the French EV industry in the 1990s was the heavy
involvement of the central government, confirming France’s penchant for dirigisme, the21
tradition of strong state intervention actively engaged in subsidizing and protecting
certain industrial enterprises
51. In fact, the development of EV technology in France can
be seen as an example of French industrial policy in action based on the cordial
relationship policymakers maintain with the business sector. The French government
designed and carried out EV policies in close consultation with automakers without
provoking any outcry from them or from any other interest group. The traditional
familiarity between businessmen and government officials fostered the development of a
shared ethos concerning the main tenets of the EV policy thereby reducing the risk of
confrontations. The government upheld its central role long after it had passed the law.
Indeed, the Ministry of the Environment set up the Conseil National de L’Air, a study
group, whose goal was to assess the effectiveness of the Loi sur L’air. The Conseil
National de L’Air produced a report where the Minister Corinne Lepage admitted that the
Loi sur l’Air could have been much more stringent had it not been for the pressures of oil
and automobile companies (CNA, 2001)
52.
The contributions to the debate on EV technology in the media as well as in
academic and research circles lacked the ideological virulence that characterized the
American scene. This is understandable given that the French EV regulations were not
nearly as stringent and binding as those adopted in California. What is still remarkable is
that even mildly critical technology assessments were practically absent. The vast
majority of technical reports produced (by and large in government research institutes)
throughout the 1990s accepted the premise that EVs constituted a viable and cost-
effective technology capable to achieve the goals indicated in the government documents
(Clip 1994; Lamure, 1996; CIVP, 2000; Clip, 2001)
53.
The American pluralist model has always been aesthetically as well as politically
distasteful to the French as it suggests a permanent state of conflict, compromise and
expediency. In contrast to American faith in the virtues of pluralism and open access to
the policymaking process, French technocrats display a Cartesian belief in reason and
planning and believe that market forces do not necessarily produce a socially optimal
outcome without the close supervision of the state. Several scholars have concluded,
approvingly, that France is moving away from its dirigiste model (Schmidt, 1996; Levy,
1996; Mustar and Laredo, 2002). However, although France is indisputably shedding
aspects of its heritage, the country has not, as far as the EV industry is concerned,
abandoned its dirigiste model just yet
54. Much of the interaction between government and
business, the discussions, the meetings and the consultations took place without any need
to resort to legislative action. Therefore the process was characterized by a tendency to
conduct policymaking activity behind closed doors, free of public scrutiny (Lepage,
2003). Given the cooperative atmosphere between government and business, it is hardly
surprising that the latter did not take a public stance against the former. Indeed, no
interest group claimed that EV technology was ineffective to curb air pollution, let alone
challenged the legislation in public or in the courts. In this respect, France provided a
clear alternative model to the law-saturated one existing in the United States
55.
If the ZEV mandate was predicated on pervasive American technological
optimism, the effort demonstrated by the French in the development of a national EV
industry suggests that the United States does not have a monopoly on technological
enthusiasm and know-how. France has a remarkable record of technological
achievements such as high-speed trains (train à grande vitesse: TGV), civilian aircraft22
(Caravelle), telecommunications (the Minitel system) and nuclear industry
56. However,
French technological prowess is driven by a rationale that does not coincide with the
utilitarian enthusiasm at work in the US. Above all, technological programs in France
even when they are consumer-oriented, tend to push forward a national agenda. In this
respect, nuclear reactors, the TGVs and the Concordes have continued the tradition of
Colbert's  grands projets, where technological achievements blended with political
purposes
57. Developed and operated by state companies, these programs aimed to address
a particular problem (boost an ailing electronics industry, reduce dependence on foreign
oil, develop fast transportation to and from Paris) but were also designed to enhance
France's international prestige. At stake in every grand projet was la grandeur of France.
They served to build up French national pride and bring the nation together
58. Ultimately,
the EV technology program, although, pursued without the conviction of other grand
projets, can be seen as a national strategy designed to affirm French supremacy in
advanced automotive technology.
Another important element that distinguished the development of the French EV
policies from its Californian counterpart was the weak role played by environmental
groups. There are two major reasons for this. Although French culture can claim in J.J.
Rousseau the first modern thinker who planted the seeds of modern green philosophy, the
level of environmental awareness in the France is lower than that in the United States. In
the institutional arena, the Ministry of the Environment created in 1971 had to struggle to
maintain an independent identity from other more powerful ministries (in particular the
Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of the Industry and the Ministry of Energy) and has
often succumbed to them when confronted with policies that opposed their interests
59.
And, even if in 1995, a new law empowered environmental groups by giving them a
formal venue in which to influence the decision-making process, the level of mobilization
remains far weaker than it is in most northern European countries and in the United
States (Hayes, 2002, Szarka, 2002).
Therefore, although in the mid 1990s the exacerbation of air pollution and
congestion in most metropolitan areas increased the level of environmental activism,
environmental organizations, by their own admission, have played only a marginal role in
the decision-making process, especially that which led to the Loi sur l’Air (Godinot,
2001; Lefetey, 2001; Rebelle, 2001). Even though there is a multitude of associations that
advance environmental issues, few have a national scope and all suffer from an endemic
lack of financial resources (Szarka, 2002). Additionally, France’s fragmented
environmental movement has played only a small role in forming the policies intended to
control urban air pollution, in part because few if any of the major environmental groups
can afford paid staff to follow a thorny issue such as transportation (Lefetey, 2001).
Ultimately, the evolution of EV policies has reflected the traditional view that the state is
the principal and often the sole guarantor of the public good and that interest groups are
almost superfluous and certainly less legitimate than the government
60.
6.2 The ZEV mandate and the allure of technology23
Faced with the difficult problem of cleaning up the foul air of the cities of
California, the CARB proposed an ambitious program that relied exclusively on
technological improvements. Indeed, the LEV program did not contemplate any action to
induce Californians to drive less. The policy choices made by the CARB have been in
tune with the past regulatory tradition in which policymakers have not favored the
application of land-use planning, demand travel management and fuel tax policies as
means to reduce automobile emissions. In the transportation sector there has been a clear
preference for technology standards within the framework of command and control
regulations while at the same time big investments in highway infrastructure combined
with zoning rules effectively enabled and accelerated the phenomenon of suburbanization
and urban sprawl.
This does not mean that the CARB has not recognized the link between land-use
planning and the benefits of alternative strategies to curb automobile emissions. In the
1990s, the Transportation Strategies Group at CARB sponsored several studies that
highlighted the linkages between air quality benefits, land use and demand travel
management strategies acknowledging that increasing public transit ridership and higher
residential densities would assist in the long-term improvement and maintenance of
California’s air quality. However, as the former chief manager of the group
acknowledged, when it comes to design programs to clean the air in California's cities,
the CARB's priorities lie elsewhere (Geraghty, 1998). A speech made in 1998 by J.D.
Dunlap, then CARB chairman, provides some insight into those priorities:
Since the early 1950s, when the connection between motor vehicles
and smog was established, we've had a clear choice: We can either tell
the automakers to make cleaner cars, or we tell Californians not to
drive - and we're not going to tell Californians not to drive (Dunlap,
1997).
In the vision for a clean-air future articulated by Dunlap there appears to be scant place
for land-use planning or public transit policies
61. This view of the options available to
improve air quality is endorsed by many transportation experts and policy analysts. At the
1995 Asilomar Conference on Sustainable Transportation Energy Strategies, a group of
well-known experts, reached this conclusion:
The issues raised in the wrap-up session lead some of us to conclude
that real progress in achieving sustainable transportation will have to
be based on very good and nearly transparent technologies.
(Transparent, in this case, refers to technologies that would involve no
change in consumer perceptions and behavior.) (McNutt, Fulton and
Greene, 1997) (emphasis added).
In the same year, Daniel Sperling, an academic who has written often in support of EVs,
stated: “it is almost impossible to imagine a scenario in which a public transit as we know
it in the US would expand its role in passenger travel, all trends suggest that
suburbanization is unlikely to be reversed…” (Sperling, 1995)24
Dunlap reflects the expectations of many other policy analysts when he expressed a
strong reluctance to employ measures that would constrain the mobility of the American
driver. Fiscal instruments (gasoline taxes), travel demand management policies
(carpooling, high occupancy lanes), shift to public transit, which can be perceived as
unbearable restrictions on individual freedom of choice, have met strong resistance even
when they have enjoyed some measure of success. Certainly, any policymaker attempting
to curb private passenger car demand would face a daunting task. Decades of sprawl have
effectively marginalized public transport systems - inefficient in areas of low population
densities - so that the commitment to private passenger cars and low fuel prices has
become so strong that it would be extremely difficult for policymakers to reverse the
course of an entrenched way of life.
The United States is a society that prizes individualism and distrusts government
interference in public affairs. Since laissez-faire ideology exerts great influence on the
public discourse and on the political agenda, environmental regulations which stimulate
technological solutions and do not threaten citizens’ lifestyles or core American values
look very appealing to many policymakers
62. As the ultimate technological fix, ZEVs do
not call for efforts to change consumer behavior as would be necessary if demand travel
management or public transit policies were implemented
63. And policymakers in
California know full well that it would be very difficult to pull the citizens of the state out
of their cars.
The CARB’s penchant for technological solutions to clean the air also reflects
Americans’ strong faith in the ability of technology to solve society’s problems. To be
sure, the attitude of Americans toward technology is complex and has changed over the
years. As early as the period of the first successes of the industrialized society more
ambivalent views began to set in. More recently and more dramatically, after the advent
of nuclear weapons it became increasingly difficult to view technology solely as a benign
agent of change. But overall, Americans remain in awe of technological progress
64.  This
special relationship with technology is revealed by the remarkable degree of attention that
the ZEV regulation has received in the press and among policymakers and industrial
entrepreneurs. It would be difficult to dispute the positive impacts of technological
advancement for private passenger cars. Yet, the effects of an excessive faith in the
promise of automobile technology are evident in Southern California and throughout the
United States. Although over the past 25 years California has been the recognized as the
world-leader in pioneering policies to curb automobile emissions, many areas of the state
are still affected by the foulest air in the nation
65. Sophisticated technological
advancements have so far proved woefully insufficient to offset the huge growth of the
private car fleet and its stagnant fuel economy.
66   
7. Conclusions
Throughout the 1990s California and France each responded to concerns about
urban air quality by making substantial efforts to promote the use of EVs.  It is clear that
these efforts had an effect; most of the worlds current stock of EVs can be found in these
two areas.  To date, however, this direct effect has been small; only a few thousand
vehicles are driven in each place.  Indirect effects, however, may prove to be much
larger. The pathways taken by California and France were very different.  California,
acting through the CARB, took an active regulatory role that was explicitly and very
publicly technology forcing. The response was also very public; there were lawsuits and25
advertising campaigns both for and against the mandates; but along with complaints,
industry put forth a very extensive research and development effort on batteries, fuel
cells, and electric drive trains.  While the CARB maintained an aggressive posture, it
continued to monitor the suitability of available EV technology and modified its mandate
accordingly.  The emphasis was on development of vehicles which consumers would
accept. Revisions to the mandate, reflected the CARB’s recognition that EVs were not
yet viable and allowed the agency to steer a technological trajectory which also served to
catalyze alternative developments, notably hybrid vehicles which are already more
popular than Evs and new progress toward vehicles powered by fuel cells.
The establishment of strict standards and flexible implementation timetables
coupled with the imposition of penalties and the commitment by a few major automakers
to substantial R&D and commercial programs to reduce emissions, triggered a critical
new phase of technological progress. In this respect, the CARB’s mandate represents a
watershed in the shift in road transportation from petroleum to electricity, yielding the
accompanying benefits of reductions in air pollutants (including green house gases) and
fuel-economy improvements.
In contrast with the American process, the French path to an EV industry was
utterly guided from above with negligible public dialogue and controversy. While
significant portions of American society engaged in a discussion of the new technology,
fiercely assessing its merits and its drawbacks, the French public, the media and analysts
remained quite aloof showing only a quiet interest in EVs. Rather than indicating an
authentic national consensus about the effectiveness of EVs to reduce car emissions, the
absence of controversies about EVs in France signaled a deficit of public participation
and accountability. The programs and the legislation developed in France to electrify a
fraction of the national car fleet were anything but a grand project and did not amount to
industrial policy, although for several years they had the pretense of being one.
Ambivalence about the program is now emerging both in government and in industry,
where the apparent issue is not so much what electric vehicles can contribute but rather
how much of a commitment government, industry and other institutions are willing to
make to them.  And France has so far shown very little interest in the hybrid technology
that has emerged from electric vehicle research and development. Such differences in
approach confirm what a number of observers of the international environmental health
and safety arena noted earlier.  Despite growing market integration and enmeshment of
economic policy, industrialised nations retain distinctly different policy styles
(Lundqvist, 1980; Badaracco, 1985; Vogel, 1986; Brickman et al., 1985; Weber and
Hoogma, 1998).  Indeed, the policy landscapes in which regulators, interest groups, the
public at large interacted and pursued their goals in France and in California could
scarcely differ more.
The differences in policy approach are only part of the story.  France and
California evince deep differences in attitude toward technology.  In California (and the
U.S. generally) technology provides solutions to problems, and technological solutions
are generally preferred to solutions which require behavioral change or cultural
adaptation. In France technology reflects a compromise between government and
industry; it is a form of cultural elitism.
Whatever the outcome of the EV story, the road ahead in California looks
different from that in France. From a California perspective, EVs still do not yet appear26
commercially viable whereas hybrid vehicles, which have emerged during the CARB
mandates do; suitably developed and put into general use they could lead to very
substantial reductions in emissions.  On the horizon fuel cell technology beckons, and
one more breakthrough in battery technology could bring EVs back into play. There is
still no interest in non-technological demand-side approaches to reducing emissions.
From a French perspective the vision of a society transformed by EV use coupled
with other adaptations in public and private transport seems to be waning but still exists.
The question is whether this vision will find a real commitment in French institutions. If
it does not, France may simply come to use the prevailing technologies (such as hybrids)
on the international market with a yet to be determined commitment to reduced
emissions.
What are the lessons from this review? Technology forcing can work and can lead
to substantial and important new capabilities.  But the changes and the consequent
technological evolution may follow an unpredictable path, yielding unexpected results.
And the development of new capabilities does not necessarily translate into their
widespread adoption and use.  Industrial policy also can work and has worked in other
settings in France (and elsewhere), but the very limited implementation of EV technology
demonstrates that industrial policy requires a firm institutional commitment.
In democratic countries policies reflect, however imperfectly, the demands and
the aspirations of public opinion. The difficulties encountered in both California and
France to implement EV policies suggest  that public support for sustainable
transportation is not as strong as is often assumed. In other words, even though the
citizens of California and – to a less degree of France – may express positive attitudes
towards ambitious environmental goals, they are not yet prepared to change their
lifestyles to achieve these goals.  For either approach, success will ultimately require a
cultural adaptation.
Notes
1 Established in 1967 to promote and protect the public health, the CARB has focused on three main
objectives: 1) attain and maintain air quality throughout the state; 2) conduct research into the causes of and
solutions to air pollution; and 3) attack the serious environmental problem caused by motor vehicles.
2 For an analysis of the conflicts surrounding new technologies in the US see Mazur, 1982 and Nelkin,
1984.
3 Recently, Vogel argued that, since the late 1980s, the US and Europe have “traded places”. In other
words, whereas in the 1970s and in the 1980s, by adopting stringent and innovative legislation, the US
provided a strong leadership in environmental policy, over the last 15 years, European countries have taken
the lead (Vogel, 2003). Our study demonstrates that the French and American experience with EV policies
forms an exception to this trend reversal.
4Los Angeles and its suburbs lie in a basin surrounded by a ring of mountains to the east and onshore winds
from the west, which both serve to trap the pollution. Strong sunlight activity produces the photochemical
reactions that lead to smog formation, and the topography of the area is such that air movement and
pollutant dispersion are severely restricted.
5 Recent medical literature indicates that even the current level of air pollution is harmful to human health
(Bascom et al., 1996).27
6 In 1987, California set a state standard for ozone equal to 0.09 ppm (180 µg/m3) for a 1-hour averaging
time. There are many areas in the state where the state standard for ozone is exceeded more than a hundreds
times per year (SCAQMD, 2002).
7 According to the Texas Transportation Institute, in 2001, three California cities (Los Angeles, San
Francisco-Oakland and San Jose) ranked in the Institute’s top ten list of the most congested cities in the US
(Shrank and Lomax, 2002).
8 With over 540 cars per 1,000 inhabitants, France reached in 1999 the level of motorization (762 cars per
1,000 inhabitants) attained in the early 1970s in the United States (CFFA, 2000).
9The highest number of EVs in California was recorded in 2000. Since then, the number has been declining
due to the recall by Ford, Honda and GM of their EV models (Fagan, 1999; Maynard, 2002; GM, 2002).
10 The thresholds for the three ozone levels 1, 2 and 3 are 110, 180 and 360 µg/m3 respectively.
11 The category of "major manufacturers" denoted all those whose sales equaled at least 35,000 units in the
state and included Chrysler, Ford, GM, Honda, Mazda, Nissan and Toyota. According to the proposed
CARB mandate, small volume manufacturers (i.e., producing less than 3,000 vehicles for sale in
California) manufacturers were not ever required to produce ZEVs and intermediate volume (selling
between 3,000 and 35,000 units per year) would be required to produce ZEVs only in 2003.
12 Furthermore, the seven manufacturers were required to file a report providing information regarding the
number and type of ZEV placed in California and in the United States and data about the purchase of
advanced battery technology within ninety days following the close of each year.
13 Hybrid electric vehicles are equipped with two power sources: an internal combustion engine coupled to
an electric motor. For a review of HEV technology see Wouk, 1995 and Westbrook, 2001.
14Models currently available on the markets are not designed to operate only with the electric motor. Such
capability, however, could produce further benefits by controlling when and where emissions occur. With
appropriate batteries (NIMH for example) that allow for a significant all-electric range, HEVs can be
driven as ZEVs and can thus further contribute to CARB emission-reduction original goal. The idea that
HEVs could significantly reduce exhaust pollution and fuel consumption in targeted areas at particular
times was advanced already in the 1960s (Hoffman, 1967; Wouk, 1976).
15 In 2003, the EPA rated the fuel economy of a Honda Civic hybrid to be 48 mpg (combined city/highway
cycle) whereas a conventional Honda Civic was estimated to achieve only 37 mpg (EPA, 2003)
16 The creation of the new SULEV standard reflected the advancements of technology for gasoline, hybrid
and alternative fuel vehicles. In the spring of 1998, Honda had already offered for sale in California a
compressed natural gas vehicle with emission levels at one tenth of ULEV and Toyota had begun selling
the Prius, its first hybrid electric vehicle (CARB, 1998a). SULEVs would emit 0.010 (g/mi) of NMOG, 1.0
(g/mi) of CO and 0.02 (g/mi) of NOx. (CARB, 1998b). Cfr with Table 4.
17 Already available in low-volume production lines and employed in over 1000 vehicles in California,
NiMH batteries could power a 4/5 passenger EV for 75-100 miles on a single charge and had the potential
to last the life of the car, or at least 100,000 miles.
18 In the late 1980s, GM had started to invest considerable financial and human resources on a program to
manufacture an electric car, the Impact, a prototype that became in 1996, under the name EV1, the first EV
offered for sale by a major American automaker. GM had been able to take advantage of the massive
conversion programs that at the end of the Cold War were redirecting the resources of large military
industrial companies (such as Hughes and Rockwell, both GM subsidiaries whose know-how had clear
overlaps with EV technology) toward civil and commercial production (Shnayerson, 1996; Scott, 1995)
19 HEV technology received some impetus from the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV),
an R&D program developed jointly by several US government agencies with the three main American
automobile companies in 1993 with the aim of producing a passenger car with a fuel economy of 80 mpg
(National Research Council, 1996; DOE, 2002). Over the years, various commentators have debated the
real effectiveness of the PNGV program (which was terminated in 2002 to make way for the FreedomCar
program) in advancing the development of HEVs (Sperling, 2002; Malakoff, 1999).
20 In light of the potential of fuel cells to power zero emission vehicles and given the similarity of certain
components that exist both in battery- and fuel cell-powered vehicles (the electric drivetrain for instance),
the CARB mandate was instrumental in persuading venture capitalists to invest money in companies such
as Ballard (Rasul, 2001).28
21 See Rienzeman, 1995 and Henriksen et al., 1996 for a review of the main features of rechargeable battery
technology and battery-powered motor vehicles.
22 Note that the LEV program was subject to a biennial review designed to confirm the requirements or
alter those that were bound to face problems of technological feasibility.
23 Oil companies do not shy away from soliciting and accepting hundred million dollars in subsidies
(Hwang, 1995).
24 Curiously, the ad was intended to comfort readers with the assertion that "at current consumption rates
there is enough oil to support our planet's petroleum needs for about 45 years. "Indeed the estimates of
world total oil proven reserves collected by the Oil & Gas Journal over the period 1990-2000 averaged at
about 1000 billion barrels. Assuming that demand does not increase, i.e. at current consumption levels (~
75 million barrel/day), the world would run out of relatively cheap oil in 41 years. According to Mobil’s
own literature the world’s oil reserves will be severely depleted before 2050. Yet, interestingly, Mobil, was
confident that a 45 year time horizon would reassure the general public.
25 One ad (Mobil, 1995) reported the findings of a study carried out at Carnegie-Mellon University widely
considered very partial against EVs. See Socolow and Thomas, 1997 for a critical review of the study and
also section 4.2 following.
26 Astroturf refers to the synthetic grass product. By means of this strategy, corporations conceal their
involvement in lobbying initiatives behind the guise of grassroots movements.
27 CALPIRG estimated that WSPA gave $1 million to Woodward & McDowell over a period of 20 months
(Kasnitz and Maschke, 1996).
28 Such negative concerns were never voiced by real emergency response workers (Mendelson, 1997).
29 Unlike automobile manufacturers and oil companies, California’s electric utilities were not hostile to the
ZEV mandate. Utility companies assumed that most of EV charging would occur at night thus opening a
new market exploiting idle off-peak generation capacity (Nesbitt et al., 1992). As in many other states in
the U.S., California could benefit from replacing ICEVs with EVs since the state electricity is produced
from relatively clean fuel sources. In the mid 1990s, more than 32 percent of the electricity consumed in
the state was produced by renewable resources, almost 15 percent came from nuclear energy and about 15
per cent from natural gas (California Energy Commission, 2002).
30 The bleak conclusions reached by SR about the effectiveness of the ZEV regulations were cited by
several organizations hostile to the mandate, including some astroturf groups in their comments during the
public workshops sponsored by CARB in 1995 (Mangels, 1995; Dale, 1995). During the workshop that
took place on November 8 1995 both Anita Mangels, executive director of CAHT and Larry Larry  Dale of
Larry Dale Associates backed up their statements on the supposedly disastrous consequences of the ZEV
mandate with figures and arguments drawn from the Sierra Research reports.
31 The title of the article implied that all EVs use lead-acid batteries, whereas it is generally known that
lead-acid batteries are only one type of the batteries that power EVs.
32 The technological assessment carried out at Carnegie-Mellon was partly funded by Green Design
Consortium, a coalition of industrial groups that included Exxon Research and Engineering, GM-Delco
Chassis, GM-Packard Electric, Mobil R&D, and Shell Development (Kasnitz and Maschke, 1996).
33 The Impact and the EV1 are the same car. Believing that the first name lacked consumer appeal GM
renamed the car.
34 Lave, Hendrikson and McMichael proceeded to carry their analysis further in Environmental Science and
Technology (Lave et al., 1996) where they purported to demonstrate that the health hazards derived by the
use of EVs powered by PbA batteries compared unfavorably with those once associated with the use of
vehicles powered by leaded gasoline. The EST article became the subject of a thorough assessment carried
out at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton University. The authors of the
assessment, challenged the conclusions reached by Lave et al. by underlining that treating the hazards
provided by lead-acid batteries and lead additives in gasoline on the same footing was misguided (Socolow
and Thomas, 1997).
35 Among the many other studies assessing either the ZEV mandate or some aspect of EV technology see
Moomaw et. al, 1994; Hall et. Al., 1995; Gordon and Richardson, 1995 and Dixon and Garber, 1996.
36 The US is known for its inclination to resolve public policy issues by means of formal, adversarial
processes where, unlike most industrialized countries, judicial intervention is the rule rather than the
exception. For a comprehensive critical analysis of American “adversarial legalism” see Kagan, 2001.29
37The involvement of the French government in the generation, distribution, and sale of electricity is unique
in Western Europe.
38 In 1998, 76,5% and 12,2 % of electricity were generated by nuclear and hydroelectric power respectively
(IEA, 2001a)
39 Despite massive mobilizations, the French antinuclear movement is not organized in a national lobby as
similar movements are in Germany or Sweden. Regulatory process provided virtually no opportunity for
public participation and French law did not permit challenges to nuclear-power-site decisions in the courts
(Touraine et al., 1980; Nelkin and Pollak, 1981; Kitschelt, 1986).
40 Concerns for the unsolved problem of nuclear waste disposal notwithstanding. See Touraine et al. 1980.
41 Two small environmental groups which had no problem in endorsing nuclear energy sources for EVs:
l’Association des Écologistes pour le Nucleaire close at the time to the right wing party Le Front National
(Comby, 2002) and Le Mouvement National Lutte pour Environnement affiliated with the Parti
Communiste Française (Prince, 2003).
42 The skepticism of the French environmental movement towards EV technology is summarized fairly well
in an editorial by Les Amis de la Terre (Samuel, 1995)
43 An ad hoc consortium set up to foster the development of EVs
44 Procotip, a shared-use vehicle program, had already been tested in 1971 in Montpellier with modest
results (Benezra, 1995).
45 After an experimental phase initiated in 1993, the city of La Rochelle established in 1999 LISELEC,
another EV car-sharing project that is still active (Benezra, 1995; Hoogma and Simon, 1998). A notable
impulse towards EV development in La Rochelle was the personal involvement of the late Michel Crépeau
the city mayor and former Minister of the Environment (1981-1984). After PSA shut down a factory in the
region in the early 1980s, Crépeau strived to make La Rochelle an industrial center for EV technology with
the dual aims of cleaning the air and reducing unemployment (Pasquet, 1996; Hoogma and Simon, 1998).
Similar car-sharing programs have been set up in several US cities (Shaheen and Meyn, 2002).
46 At the end of 2002 there were about 3500 EVs in the rest of Europe (GIVE, 2003)
47 In 1996, R&D, Renault magazine, described the progress on its hybrid prototype in the following terms:
“Renault has invented a revolutionary new concept car that was unveiled in 1995, the Next… The Next has
been specially designed with the aim of breaking all fuel economy records. It burns 3.4 L/100 km of petrol.
However attractive such a solution, though, it remains a futuristic dream” (R&D, 1996).
48 Until the spring of 2003 fewer than 200 Toyota Prius had been bought since their introduction on the
French market in 2000 (Boyer, 2003).
49 See NOx trespassing level 3 (400 mg/m3) in
50 Note that the president of the Fédération française des automobiles-clubs (which adopted the slogan
“Non au PDU, oui à la voiture") has argued that “Pollution will be curbed by means of technological
development and not through traffic-volume reductions (Hopquin, 2002)"
51 See Shoenfield, 1965 and Crozier, 1970 for two eloquent analyses of the nature of the dirigiste model.
Michel Crozier contributed a psychological explanation for the French model. In his view, the French
people have shied away from face-to-face confrontations and rather than resolving problems among
themselves, they have traditionally sought refuge in a higher authority, i.e. the state, since an inclination to
avoid open conflicts created a strong need to establish the state as a principal rule-maker and arbiter
(Crozier, 1970).
52 On the pressures exerted by automakers to weaken the air pollution legislation see also Lepage, 1998.
53 A rare and notable exception is a cost-benefit analysis that concluded: “the cost of air pollution is not
enough to give EV a clear advantage against all conventional cars, even in Paris” (Funk and Rabl, 1999).
54 At least two forces are weakening the twin traditions of Colbertisme and dirigisme: on the one hand, the
regulatory competence that once rested with national governments is increasingly shifting towards the
European Union (Bailey, 1997) and on the other, the formation of new transnational business alliances (see,
in the automobile sector, the agreements between leading Japanese firms like Nissan and Toyota with
national automakers (Kewley, 2002).
55 French institutional arrangements discourage citizens from solving social problems by means of litigation
and the symbiotic relationship between the French government and industry makes litigation very rare
(Jacob et al., 1996).
56 Even those achievements have been subject to sharp criticism. See Salomon, 1986.30
57 To appreciate how grand technological projects, in particular the nuclear energy program, served to
define the French national identity in the second half of the XX century, see Hecht, 1998.
58 There are several historical accounts that show how, even unsuccessful projects (cf. the Concorde
airplane) tend, by and large, to receive quasi-unanimous approval. See Bess, 2003. Whereas we have seen
that American national pride does not necessarily coalesce around technological projects. If anything, in the
U.S., technological fixes (cf. Prozac, SDI, EVs) tends to divide the nation rather than bring it together.
59 For a recent view of the weakness of the Ministry of the Environment see Morand Deviller, 1990.
60 See Baumgartner, 1996 for an elucidation of this point.
61 To be sure, the California legislature has not given CARB authority over moving people and goods on its
roads and highways. This authority remains with the State Department of Transportation as well as with
regional, county and city transportation agencies (Kopp, 1997). However, the overall effect is that as a state
agency with great authority over drafting policies to reduce air pollution, CARB can send recommendations
to these bodies, which, in turn, are obliged to give them strong consideration.
62 The influence of free-market ideology in the U.S is often more rhetorical than real. Indeed, in many areas
of consumer, environmental and safety regulation US government agencies have traditionally used
command-and-control instruments that are far more stringent and meddlesome than the market-based tools
customarily employed in Europe. See Harris and Milkis, 1996 and Vogel, 2003.
63 It must be noted that some scholars contend that driving an EV can change peoples driving habits (for
instance, due to the EVs’ limited range, drivers tend  to plan their trips more carefully) as well as general
attitudes toward transportation issues. For a discussion of the civic values of EV technology see Brown,
2001.
64 There is evidence of this in many contexts of American life. Popular culture provides many examples:
the popularity of magazines (Popular Mechanics,  Popular Science, etc.) that probe the minutiae of
technological advancement and films like Apollo 13 in which technological ingenuity - a precious national
virtue - represents the ability to overcome mortal challenge. For scrutiny and skeptical views of American
technological optimism see Marx, 1987; Hughes, 1989; Nye, 1994 and Segal, 1994.
65 Ozone levels in California have dropped significantly throughout the 1990s whereas progress in other
regions of the U.S. has not been as dramatic.  Nevertheless, in 2002 the 16 most severe violations of the
EPA ozone 1-hour standard were all in California (EPA, 2003c).
66 This trend, as strong as it is in Europe, occurs at a greater rate in the United States. In Europe
transportation by car has increased from 73% in 1965 to 83% in 1989 and conversely train and bus usage
has declined from 14% and 13% to 7% and 7% in the same years.1
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